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REFLECTIONS ON EXCHANGE RATES AND
DOLLARIZATION*
Steve H. Hanke**
The dramatic events in Asia, Russia and Brazil during the
past year have generated a torrent of commentary about
exchange rates, "hot money," exchange controls and
"dollarization." As someone whose views about exchange rates
in Asia have been vindicated, who predicted that the Russian
ruble would collapse shortly after midyear,2 and who concluded
that the Brazilian real would fall apart after the October 1998
presidential elections,3 I offer my thoughts as to why most of the
commentary has either been half-baked or dead wrong.
The wags in Washington misdiagnosed the patients and
prescribed the wrong medicine in Asia, Russia and Brazil. But
that has not stopped the "doctors of rotational medicine" from

spinning a different story, one that is contradicted by the facts.
Just yesterday, U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summers said that the financial turmoil that has affected Asia,
Russia and Brazil in the past year would have been worse without

the IMF. 4

* This speech was originally presented at the Derivatives and Risk
Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets, held at
Fordham University School of Law on January 28, 1999.
** Professor of Applied Economics, The Johns Hopkins University.
1. See Monetary Mischief, FARE. EcoN. REv., July 2, 1998, at 70
(suggesting that major economic upheaval in Indonesia could have been
avoided if Prof. Hanke's proposal to introduce a currency board had been
adopted).
2. See Steve H. Hanke, Is the Ruble Next?, FoRBES, March 9, 1998, at 64
(predicting that the Russian ruble would be devalued due to pressure
generated by turbulent international markets).
3. See Steve H. Hanke, Will Brazil Be Next?, FORBES, October 20, 1997, at
44 (predicting that Brazil would face a currency crisis after its 1998
presidential elections).
4. See Economic Turmoil Would Be Worse Without IMF, Dow Jones
News Serv., January 27,1999, available in Westlaw, Wires Database.
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THE WORLD'S CHANGING CURRENCY LANDSCAPE

To put my reflections into perspective, it is instructive to
consider recent changes in the world's currency landscape. Its
morphology has been in a state of flux during the decade of the
1990s. Volatile hot money flows have battered pegged exchange
rate regimes, causing volcanic-like eruptions in the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism (1992 and 1993), the Turkish lira
(1994), the Mexican peso (1994-95), the Thai baht and the other
Asian currencies (1997-98), the Russian ruble (1998) and the
Brazilian real (1999).'
Balkanization has also been a prominent force in the 1990s.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large unified currency
area was dismembered. In consequence, 15 national currencies
officially circulate where the ruble once ruled the roost. Much of
the same occurred after Yugoslavia broke apart. Now five
currencies circulate as legal tender in a region where one
currency used to do the job.
The last time currency balkanization occurred on such a
grand scale in Europe was during the period of monetary chaos
that followed World War I. In 1914, Europe had ten currencies,
all with fixed gold parities and fixed exchange rates. By 1920,
Europe had twenty-seven paper currencies, none with a gold
parity or a fixed exchange rate.
Even more dramatic than the trend toward balkanization has
been that of unification. Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria
and Bosnia have unified their domestic currencies with stronger
anchor currencies by establishing currency board systems
(CBSs).6 In 1998, Indonesia and Russia flirted with CBS
5. See, e.g., John M. Berry, In a Decade, a World of Currency Woes,
Post, Feb. 7, 1999, at H15 (reviewing currency crises that struck
Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia, Brazil, and caused
WASH.

volatility in the European Union's exchange rate mechanism, in the late
1990s); Andrew Bary, TradingPoints: Here's Why Those ForeignBonds Were
Yielding So Much, BARRON'S, Apr. 11, 1994, at MW8 (discussing the economic
effect of currency crises in Turkey and Mexico in 1994).
6. Until the 1950s, orthodox CBSs were widely used, particularly in
Africa, the Caribbean and Asia. In 1983 Hong Kong reestablished a CBS, but
it deviated from orthodoxy in several important ways, as do all the CBSs
introduced in the 1990s. All CBSs have performed well even during civil wars.
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proposals.7 These two CBS episodes merit special attention for
the light they shed on the international politics of currency
reform and the Machiavellian role played by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury and the IMF. The Clinton
administration was determined to mortally wound or topple
President Suharto,8 and it was betting on monetary chaos to do
the job. When President Suharto embraced the CBS idea in
February 1998, the U.S. Treasury and its stalking horse, the IMIF,
panicked because they thought the CBS would stabilize the
rupiah and elevate Suharto to the status of a Javanese god. This
explains why the U.S. Treasury and the IMF used their friends in
the press to mount a swift and massive counterattack. The
Russian story was quite different, however. In August 1998, the
Clinton administration was desperately trying to prop up the
ruble and President Yeltsin.9 That's why a CBS for Russia was
viewed in a favorable light by the U.S. Treasury and the IMF.
They knew that Bulgaria's CBS had provided a quick fix for the
hyperinflating lev in July 1997.
On January 1, 1999, eleven European countries embarked on
the greatest monetary experiment of the century. That's when
they unified their national currencies and replaced them with a
For a general discussion of currency boards and a more detailed explanation of
their main features, see Alan Walters and Steve H. Hanke, Currency Boards,
in i THE NEw PALGRAVE DIcIoNARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 558 (Peter
Newman, Murray Milgate & John Eatwell eds., 1992).
7. See Steve H. Hanke, How I Spent My Spring Vacation, INT'L ECONOMY,
July/Aug. 1998, at 30 (reviewing Indonesia's consideration of a currency board
in spring 1998); Christopher L. Culp, Steve H. Hanke & Merton Miller, The
Case for an Indonesian Currency Board, BANK OF AM. J. APPLIED CORP.FiN.,
Winter 1999, at 57, 57 (same); Steve H. Hanke, How to Save Russia, Ir'L
ECONOMY, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 44 (noting debate over whether Russia should
adopt a currency board, and proposing a draft currency board law).
8. See Foreign Power Made Me Quit, Says Suharto, SiNGAPORE SRArrs
Tnms, Jan. 28, 1999, at 23 (reporting an admission by former President
Suharto of Indonesia that he was forced to step down in 1998 as a result of
pressure from an unnamed foreign country with extensive interests in
Indonesia).
9. See, e.g., Jacob M. Schlesinger, Carla Anne Robbins & Bob Davis, U.S.
Policy Makers Put Focus on Russia as Arena Where They Can Make Impact,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1998, at C19 (describing efforts by the Clinton
administration to prevent a devaluation of the Russian ruble).
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new currency, the Euro.
This currency unification was
accomplished by establishing a monetary union. The European
Monetary Union has been followed by calls to establish other
monetary unions, most notably in the Mercosurian and Asian
regions."0
If all these changes in the world's currency landscape
weren't dramatic enough, Russia and Belarus are negotiating a
deal in which the Belarus hare would be replaced by the Russian
ruble." And now Argentina is studying the possibility of pushing
its currency unification with the United States to the limit by
officially replacing the peso with the U.S. dollar. 2 Argentina's
move has motivated monetary unification discussions in Central
and Eastern Europe. Indeed, these countries are beginning to
debate "dollarization" or the replacement of their national
currencies with the euro.
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
There are three types of exchange-rate regimes: floating,
fixed and pegged. Each type has different characteristics and
generates different results. Although floating and fixed rates
appear to be dissimilar, they are members of the same family.
Both are free-market mechanisms for international payments.13
With a floating rate, a monetary authority sets a monetary policy,
10.

See Paul Blustein, Currenciesin Crisis; Turmoil Spurs Callsfor Change,

But System Will be Hard to Fix, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 1999, at HI (noting a
proposal by Joseph Yam, chief of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, that
Asia should consider creating single currency unit).
11. See Irina Yasina, A HarebrainedUnion, Moscow TMfs, Jan. 5,1999, at
8 (reporting talks between Russia and Belarus on the creation of a unified
currency).
12. See Stephen Fidler and Ken Warn, Argentine Central Bank Presents
Plan for Switch to Dollar, FiN. TimEs, Jan. 22, 1999, at 1 (reporting that
Argentina's central bank presented its government with a report describing
how the country could surrender its currency in favor of the U.S. Dollar).
13. This explains why Professor Milton Friedman, who is known for his
advocacy of floating exchange rates, has also been a longtime strong advocate
of currency board systems and fixed exchange rates for developing countries.
See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY AND ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT: THE
Houowrrz LEcruREs OF 1972 38-67 (1973) (discussing monetary policy in
developing countries).
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but has no exchange rate policy. The exchange rate is on autoIn consequence, the monetary base is determined
pilot.
domestically by a monetary authority. Whereas, with a fixed
rate, a monetary authority sets the exchange rate, but has no
monetary policy. The monetary policy is on auto-pilot. In
consequence, under a fixed-rate regime, the monetary base is
determined by the balance of payments. In other words, when a
country's official net foreign reserves increase, its monetary base
increases and vice versa. With both of these free-market
exchange rate mechanisms, there cannot be conflicts between
exchange-rate and monetary policies, and consequently, balance
of payment crises cannot occur. Indeed, under floating and fixedrate regimes, market forces act to automatically rebalance
financial flows and avert balance of payments crises.
While both floating and fixed-rate regimes are equally
desirable in principle, it must be stressed that floating rates,
unlike fixed rates, do not perform well in developing countries
because these countries usually have weak monetary authorities
and histories of monetary instability.'4 Indeed, currencies in
developing countries rarely float on a sea of tranquility.
Knowledge of this fact would, no doubt, have prompted IMF
Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer to temper his

remarks concerning Indonesia's float of the rupiah. On the day
of the float, August 14, 1998, Dr. Fischer proclaimed that "The
management of the JVIF welcomes the timely decision of the
The floating of the rupiah, in
Indonesian authorities.
combination with Indonesia's strong fundamentals, supported by
prudent fiscal and monetary policies, will allow its economy to
continue its impressive economic performance of the last several
years.""5
Fixed and pegged rates appear to be the same. However,
they are fundamentally different. Pegged rates are not freemarket mechanisms for international payments. Pegged rates,
14. See generally Steve H. Hanke, Some Reflections on CurrencyBoards,in
CENmTAL BANKING, MONETARY POLIciEs, AND TiE IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANsTION

ECONOMIES 341 (Mario I. B16jer & Marko Skreb, eds., 1999).
15. IMF Welcomes Indonesia's Exchange Rate Action, News Brief No.
97/18, Int'l Monetary Fund (Aug. 14, 1997) <http:!/www.imf.org/externallnp/

sec/nb/1997/NB9718.HTM>.
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such as those that were employed throughout most of Asia and in
Russia and Brazil before the recent currency crises, require a
monetary authority to manage both the exchange rate and
monetary policy. With a pegged rate, the monetary base contains
both domestic and foreign components. Unlike floating and
fixed rates, pegged rates invariably result in conflicts between
exchange rate and monetary policies. For example, when capital
inflows become "excessive" under a pegged system, a monetary
authority often attempts to sterilize the ensuing increase in the
foreign component of the monetary base by reducing the
domestic component of the monetary base. And when outflows
become "excessive," an authority attempts to offset the decrease
in the foreign component of the base with an increase in the
domestic component of the monetary base. Balance of payments
crises erupt as a monetary authority begins to offset more and
more of the reduction in the foreign component of the monetary
base with domestically created base money. When this occurs,
it's only a matter of time before currency speculators spot the
contradictions between exchange rate and monetary policies and
force a devaluation.
HOT MONEY AND EXCHANGE CONTROLS

Hot money flows are principally associated with pegged
exchange rates. Most analysts have misdiagnosed the hot money
problem because they have failed to appreciate this all-important
linkage. In consequence, they have prescribed exchange controls
as a cure-all to cool off the hot money. That prescription treats
the symptoms. It fails to treit the disease, which is pegged
exchange rates. Until pegged rates are abandoned, there will be
volatile hot money flows and calls to cool the hot money with
exchange controls.
Professor Paul Krugman is the most notable promoter of
exchange controls. 6 Alas, Malaysia's mercurial prime minister,
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, took Professor Krugman's bait and
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Saving Asia, It's Time To Get Radical,
Sep. 7, 1998 (recommending that Asian countries in financial crisis
adopt exchange controls).
16.

FORTUNE,
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imposed draconian controls on September 2, 1998.17 Like all
pyromaniacs, Professor Krugman has now washed his hands of
this dastardly deed. Perhaps this is the most devastating critique
of controls. But there is more.
Currency convertibility is a simple concept. It means
residents and non-residents are able to exchange domestic
currency for foreign currency. However, there are many degrees
of convertibility, with each denoting the extent to which
governments impose controls on the exchange and use of
currency.
The pedigree of exchange controls can be traced back to
Plato, the father of statism. Inspired by Sparta of Lycurgus, Plato
embraced the idea of an inconvertible currency as a means to
preserve the autonomy of the state from outside interference.
It's no wonder, therefore, that the so-called Red-Brown
(communist-fascist) coalition in the Russian Duma has rallied
around the idea of exchange controls and an inconvertible ruble.
This also explains why the leadership in Beijing finds the idea so
user friendly.
The temptation to turn to exchange controls in the face of
disruptions caused by "hot money" flows is hardly new. Tsar
Nicholas II first pioneered limitations on convertibility in modem
times, ordering the State Bank of Russia to introduce, in 1905-06,
a limited form of exchange control to discourage speculative
purchases of foreign exchange."8 The bank did so by refusing to
sell foreign exchange, except where it could be shown that it was
required to buy imported goods. Otherwise, foreign exchange
was limited to 50,000 German Marks per person. 9 The Tsar's
rationale for exchange controls was that of limiting hot money
flows, so that foreign reserves and the exchange rate could be

17. See Barry Porter, Malaysia Sinks Into Currency Isolation, S. CmNA
MORNUNG POST, Sept. 2, 1998, at 1 (reporting Malaysia's introduction of

exchange controls in order to isolate its economy from the Asian financial
crisis of 1998).
18. See STEvE H. HANKE, LARs JONUNG & KURT SCHULER, RUssIAN
APPROACH TO REFORM 43 (1993)
CuRRENcY AND FiNANCE: A CURPENCY BoA
(reviewing the early history of central banking in Russia).
19.

Id.
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maintained. The more things change, the more they remain the
same.
But before more politicians come under the spell of exchange
controls, they should ponder the following footnote in Nobel
laureate Friederich Hayek's 1944 classic, The Road to Serfdom:
The extent of the control over all life that economic control
confers is nowhere better illustrated that in the field of
foreign exchanges. Nothing would at first seem to affect
private life less than a state control of the dealings in foreign
exchange, and most people will regard its introduction with
complete indifference.
Yet the experience of most
Continental countries has taught thoughtful people to regard
this step as the decisive advance on the path to totalitarianism
and the suppression of individual liberty. It is, in fact, the
complete delivery of the individual to the tyranny of the state,
the final suppression of all means of escape-not merely for
the rich, but for everybody. 2°
Hayek's message about convertibility has regrettably been
overlooked by many contemporary economists.
Exchange
controls are nothing more than a ring fence within which
governments can expropriate their subjects' property. Open
exchange and capital markets in fact protect the individual from
exactions because governments must reckon with the possibility
of capital flight.
From this it follows that the imposition of exchange controls
leads to an instantaneous reduction in the wealth of the country,
because all assets decline in value. To see why, let's review how
assets are priced.
The value of any asset is the sum of the expected future
installments of income it generates discounted to present value.
For example, the price of a stock represents the value to the
investor now of his share of the company's future profits, whether
issued as dividends or reinvested. The present value of future

income is calculated using an appropriate interest rate that is
adjusted for the various risks
materialize.

20.

FRMEDBRncH

A.

that the income may not

HAYEK, Tim ROAD TO SERFDOM

92 n.2 (1944).
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When convertibility is restricted, risk increases, and so the
risk-adjusted interest rate employed to value assets is higher than
it would be with full convertibility. That's because property is

held hostage and subject to a potential ransom through
expropriation. As a result, investors are willing to pay less for
each dollar of prospective income and the value of property is
less than it would be with full convertibility.
This, incidentally, is the case, even when convertibility is
allowed for profit remittances. With less than full convertibility,
there is still a danger the government will confiscate property
without compensation. This explains why foreign investors are
less willing to invest new money in a country with such controls,
even with guarantees on profit remittances.
So investors become justifiably nervous when it seems a
government is considering imposition of exchange controls. At
this point, settled money becomes "hot" and capital flight occurs.
Asset owners liquidate their property and get out while the
getting is good. Contrary to popular wisdom, restrictions on
convertibility do not retard capital flight; they promote it.
This type of capital flight (and unofficial dollarization) has
been occurring on a grand scale in capital-starved Russia.
Indeed, Russians swapped $13 billion worth of rubles for
greenbacks in 1997, a year in which the dollar-ruble rate was
This unofficial
stable and inflation was falling rapidly.
dollarization amounted to a capital export that exceeded all
capital imports to Russia in 1997. The actions of the Russian

people indicate that, among other things, they anticipated the
possibility of the imposition of exchange controls.
Restrictions on convertibility also promote other noxious
For example, if capital account convertibility is
activities.
restricted or limited and convertibility on the current account is
allowed, a two-tier currency market will be either formally or
informally established. In that case, the "investment currency"
will trade at a premium over the price of the relevant foreign
currency on the official market for current account transactions.
With two prices for the same currency, there are profits to be
derived form having capital account transactions "reclassified" as
current account transactions. That ad hoc reclassification can
usually be bought by crony capitalists, for a price.
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Full convertibility is the only guarantee that protects people's

rights to what belongs to them. Even if governments are not
compelled by arguments on the grounds of freedom, the prospect
of seeing every asset in the country suddenly lose value as a result
of exchange controls should give them pause.
CURRENCY UNIFICATION VIA CBSs AND DOLLARIZATION

As we enter the twenty-first century, globalization (the
liberalization of financial and trade flows) is threatened. Volatile
hot money flows are identified as the problem and exchange
controls the remedy. This prescription, which is based on a
wrong headed diagnosis, will lead to monetary nationalism and
the type of chaos the world encountered after World War I. The
only way to avoid such a disaster is for developing countries to
unify their currencies with stronger ones.
This can be
accomplished by either establishing a CBS or by replacing a
national currency with a strong foreign currency (official
dollarization).
An orthodox CBS is a monetary institution that issues notes
and coins. These notes and coins are backed with a minimum of
100 percent (up to a maximum of 110 percent) of foreign reserve
currency, and they are fully convertible into the reserve currency
at a fixed exchange rate on demand. In addition, an orthodox

CBS cannot act as a lender of last resort, does not regulate

reserve requirements for commercial banks, only earns
seignorage from interest on reserves and does not engage in
forward-exchange transactions.
Hong Kong's CBS, as well as those established in the 1990s,
deviates in important respects from orthodoxy. While these
CBSs have performed well, something even the skeptics have
admitted, they are not trouble free. For example, even though
Argentina weathered the storms of 1995, the spread between
interest rates on Argentine 30-day loans in pesos and dollars has
varied between 0.5 percentage points and 4.4 percentage points
during the past year. If the peso-dollar fixed exchange rate was
perfectly credible, these spreads should have been close to zero.
The peso-dollar interest rate spreads are not zero because
the Argentine CBS deviates from orthodoxy. It engages in
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lender of last resort activities, it regulates reserve requirements
for commercial banks and up to one third of the dollar
denominated reserves it holds to back its monetary liabilities can
be held in the form of bonds issued by the government of
Argentina.
To make Argentina's currency unification with the dollar
perfect, President Carlos Menem has suggested that Argentina
replace the peso with the dollar.2' This official dollarization
would close the peso-dollar interest rate spreads. In addition,
peso notes would no longer circulate and Argentina would no
longer earn seignorage from its CBS. Argentina could easily
implement official dollarization by exchanging its dollar reserves
for outstanding peso notes and coins and by declaring that all
peso assets and liabilities in Argentina be denominated in dollars.
At least 120 countries have officially used the currency of
another country at some time. Today, the best-known country
that is dollarized is Panama, which has operated under that

monetary system since 1904. However, there are twenty-seven
other countries and dependent territories that currently don't
have a national currency and use a foreign one instead. Even
though facts unambiguously support official dollarization as a
superior monetary regime, the "Prince of Spin," Lawrence
Summers, doesn't like the idea. Indeed, earlier today, Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin's Deputy pulled one of his old
Indonesian tricks out of the hat and confidently asserted that
monetary unification via dollarization would not provide a "quick
fix" for monetary crises.n
THE PERFORMANCE OF

CBSs

AND DOLLARIZATION

Some analysts fret about the inflexibility imposed by CBSs
and dollarization. The Economist summarized these sentiments
21. See Stephen Fidler and Ken Warn, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that
Argentina's central bank drafted a plan on switching to the U.S. dollar on the
order of President Carlos Menem).
22.

Stephen Fidler, Dollarization "Not a Quick Fix", FIN. TmiEs, Jan. 28,

1999, at 8 ("[C]ountries seeking to replace their currencies with the dollar

could potentially derive large advantages from such a move, but stressed
dollarization would provide no short-term fix for economic difficulties.").
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in a piece, The Great Escape, which appeared in the May 3, 1997
issue.' That article asserted that currency board systems cannot
cope with external shocks; that they are vulnerable to surges in
inflation triggered by capital inflows; and that with limited lender
of last resort capacities, they cannot deal effectively with financial
emergencies.24
The evidence does not support these oft-repeated assertions,
however. Let's look at the data from ninety-eight developing
countries during the period 1950-1993 and separate it into two
categories: countries that have pegged exchange rates and those
that have fixed rates. The latter category includes countries with
currency boards, monetary institutes, and those that rely solely
on foreign currency. On average, the growth rates, measured in
terms of GDP per capita, in countries with fixed exchange rates
were 54% greater than those with pegged exchange rates.
Furthermore, the variability of those growth rates (as measured
by their standard deviations) was virtually identical, indicating
that the lack of discretionary monetary policy with fixed
exchange rates did not result in any greater incidence or
vulnerability to external economic shocks. As for inflation, fixed
rates have proved far superior to pegged rates, with average
inflation rates being 4.9 times higher in countries with pegged
rates and 4.2 times more variable. In terms of budget deficits as a
percent of GDP, those countries utilizing pegged rates had
deficits which on average were 65% larger and 1.4 times more
variable. Finally, countries with fixed rates experienced fewer
financial emergencies.-'
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Until recently, most economists have refused to consider
CBSs or dollarization. Many have just declared that fixed rates
are "inappropriate" or claimed that the facts are "erroneous."
There's nothing new here. Indeed, Michael Polanyi concluded in
23. The GreatEscape,EcoNoMIsT, May 3, 1997, at 69.
24. Id. at 69.

25. See Steve H. Hanke, Some Thought About Currency Boards, supra
note 14.
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his 1958 book, Personal Knowledge, 6 that it is "[t]he normal
practice of scientists to ignore evidence which appears
incompatible with the accepted system of scientific knowledge." 27
With the failure of pegged and floating rates in Asia, Russia and
Brazil the tide has begun to shift. This shift is welcome and has
left me feeling a bit like Winston Churchill on his return from the
Boer War, when he remarked that "Nothing in life is so
exhilarating as to be shot at without success."

26.

MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE; TOWARDS A POST-CRrICAL

PHILOSOPHY (1958).
27.

Id. at 138.

Notes and Observations

